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Abstract
This article is about structural realism, historical continuity, laws of nature, and ceteris paribus
clauses. Fresnel’s Laws of optics support Structural Realism because they are a scientiﬁc structure
that has survived theory change. However, the history of Fresnel’s Laws which has been depicted
in debates over realism since the 1980s is badly distorted. Speciﬁcally, claims that J. C. Maxwell or
his followers believed in an ontologically-subsistent electromagnetic ﬁeld, and gave up the aether,
before Einstein’s annus mirabilis in 1905 are indefensible. Related claims that Maxwell himself did
not believe in a luminiferous aether are also indefensible. This paper corrects the record. In order to
trace Fresnel’s Laws across signiﬁcant ontological changes, they must be followed past Einstein into
modern physics and nonlinear optics. I develop the philosophical implications of a more accurate
history, and analyze Fresnel’s Laws’ historical trajectory in terms of dynamic ceteris paribus clauses.
Structuralists have not embraced ceteris paribus laws, but they continue to point to Fresnel’s Laws
to resist anti-realist arguments from theory change. Fresnel’s Laws ﬁt the standard deﬁnition of a
ceteris paribus law as a law applicable only in particular circumstances. Realists who appeal to the
historical continuity of Fresnel’s Laws to combat anti-realists must incorporate ceteris paribus laws
into their metaphysics.
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1 Introduction
1If a science professor stops her philosopher colleague in the hall and they begin to discuss the
scientist’s picture of the world, what sort of objections could the philosopher make if they were
unhappy with references to organisms and species, or to quantum ﬁelds and symmetry groups? If
this philosopher has naturalistic leanings, there are three possible paths. Epistemological objections
challenge scientists’ access to the putative entities which they study. For example, Ian Hacking
(1989) argued that astrophysicists’ studies of black holes are so dependent on human assumptions
and models that we should not accept that black holes have a mind independent existence. Social
objections challenge the rationality or eﬀectiveness of scientists’ consensus formation. For example,
the sociologist Harry Collins (1985) argued that experimental replications are question begging be-
cause the standard for a properly functioning instrument is its capacity to replicate the phenomena
in question (Godin and Gingras 2002). Historical objections ask why a philosopher should believe
their colleague now, when science’s picture of the world has changed so often? What will the pic-
ture be next year? Larry Laudan (1981) formulated this challenge as a Pessimistic Metainduction
(PMI; “meta” because he thought the underlying theories were inductive.) What is the best defence
the scientist can make?
This paper is concerned with the historical challenge to believing in scientists’ pictures of the
world. It seeks a realist’s response to a skeptical historicist. In order to specify the nature of this
challenge, philosophers have appealed to a range of theories about science itself. Thomas Kuhn saw
scientists as working within wordviews (weltanschauungen) which aﬀected their research at the level
of individual psychology, as well as at the level of communal values, ideologies, and institutions
(Kuhn [1962] 1996, [1970] 1977). This picture is holistic and not well suited to formal analysis.
Alternatively, formal analyses of science break it into pieces, such as sciences, ﬁelds, subﬁelds, and
individual theories, which are further divided into logical elements such as axioms, models of those
axioms, and representation theorems which connect models to the world (Suppes 2002, ch. 1).
In the tradition of Logical Positivism, they are less-concerned with metaphysical worldviews than
with the structure of scientiﬁc reasoning, such as explanation. I will discuss Carl Hempel and Paul
Oppenheim’s paradigmatic “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (1948) below. Elements from
both the holistic worldview image of science and the formal image of science are at play in the
debate over historical challenges to scientiﬁc realism.
Laudan’s PMI is formulated in terms of a formal concept of scientiﬁc theories as consisting of
sentences with theoretical terms such as “phlogiston,” “aether,” “caloric,” “humour,” etc.2 According
to contemporary sciences, these terms no longer “refer”; that is, scientists no longer interpret these
1. I would like to thank anonymous referees, Peter Galison, David Kaiser, Chen-Pang Yeang, and especially Michael
Friedman for reading and commenting on drafts of this paper. A poster version was presented at the 2016 Biennial Meeting
of the Philosophy of Science Association in Atlanta; I thank those who joined in the discussion. I thank Stathis Psillos for
alerting me to an error in a previous version of this paper. This work was partly undertaken while I held a Postdoctoral
Fellowship awarded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. All errors are my own.
2. In contrast, Paul Feyerabend’s similar arguments were closer to Kuhn’s worldview approach Feyerabend (1975) 2010.
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terms as referring to an entity in the world. Hilary Putnam put the argument in terms of terms:
just as no term used in the science of more than 50 (or whatever) years ago referred, so it
will turn out that no term used now […] refers.
Even if the empirical content of past theories is (approximately) included in newer theories, there
is no guarantee that the terms in the old theory would have referents in the newer theory (Putnam
1975, 184, 180).
Putnam’s solution to this problem appealed to both the formal- and worldview-images of
science. He made concessions to the historicist argument, but sought to save scientiﬁc realism
nonetheless. He gave up the possibility that terms like “ether” or “phlogiston” could refer. But he
insisted that all the historical terms of past science were not alike—we continue to use some today:
it is a fact that we can assign a referent to “gravitational ﬁeld” in Newtonian theory
from the standpoint of Relativity theory (though not to “ether” or “phlogiston”) […].
Putnam argued that the acceptability of his limited realism about referents of theoretical terms
depended on general epistemological commitments about knowledge and knowledge acquisition.
These retrospective reference assignments depend on a principle that has been called
the “Principle of Charity” or the “Principle of Beneﬁt of the Doubt”; but not on un-
reasonable “charity”. Surely the “gene” discussed in molecular biology is the gene (or
rather “factor”) Mendel intended to talk about; it is certainly what he should have
intended to talk about! (Putnam 1975, 180-81)
Here is where the holistic worldview image of science enters. The impact of general philosophical
commitments on scientists’ interpretation of evidence is a central feature of anti-realist argument.
It questions the mind-independence of scientiﬁc reality. Could Einstein have convinced Newton to
see gravity in a twentieth-century way? Did the two men’s meta-scientiﬁc ideas about evidence and
argument align? Putnam needed the answer to be “yes.” Then he could say that the term “gravity”
referred for both Newton and Einstein.
Against this thread of debate, John Worrall (1989b) made an inﬂuential argument for realism
about scientiﬁc structures, such as laws of nature. He was not convinced that a realist could save the
putative referents of scientiﬁc terms from the PMI, and he made his peace with what he thought
survived across the centuries: the structure of the relations between the terms, regardless of what
they stood for. In a philosophical sense Worrall took history quite seriously. He thought that
the question of what survived theory change—the question of whether science in some sense pro-
gresses despite breaks—was “prior” to formal concerns about, say, approximate truth: “Unless this
[pessimistic] picture of theory-change is shown to be inaccurate, then realism is surely untenable”
(Worrall 1989b, 105, 109). Instead of focusing on the dustbin of the history of science (caloric,
aether…), he focused on the monuments. Against pessimism, optimism (Worrall 1994). If theo-
retical terms did not survive scientiﬁc revolutions with their referring relations intact, philosophers
should focus on what did survive (at least approximately). Newton’s laws of motion and of gravity
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were developed in the Scientiﬁc Revolution and hold as approximations in current scientiﬁc the-
ory. Worrall’s strongest—and most inﬂuential—historical example came from nineteenth century
optics and the proposal that light was a wave-phenomena in a medium, the luminiferous aether:
Augustin Fresnel’s Laws of the reﬂection and refraction of polarized light. According to Worrall,
“continuity [across theoretical change] is one of form or structure, not of content” (Worrall 1989b,
117).
On one hand, Worrall gave up much more to historicists than Putnam did. Worrall gave up
terms and reference. While Putnam tried to ﬁnd a principled way to distinguish Newton’s “gravity”
from his “aether,” Worrall was willing to allow neutrality about the entities which were attached
to theoretical terms. Today, his proposal is called “Epistemic” Structural Realism because Worrall
allows that there are ontologically-fundamental objects (or perhaps kinds, powers, etc.) beyond
structures, but ESR denies that we have access to this level (Ladyman 1998). Whether “aether,”
“ﬁeld,” or “electron” feature in laws of nature, ESR sees limits to our ability to know whether
theoretical terms truly refer. James Ladyman and Steven French have been the most prominent
proponents of an “Ontic” Structural Realism, which put structures at the fundamental ontological
level. In its most “eliminative” strain, they argue that structures are the only fundamental entities
(Ladyman 2009). SR does not satisfy realists who desire a more straight-forward acceptance of the
“face-value” of scientists’ descriptions of the world (Putnam 1975, 193; Psillos calls this the realists’
“semantic thesis” Psillos 2005, 385).
On the other hand, SR can present a much stronger challenge to antirealist arguments which
are based on the worldview image of science.3 In SR, whether Fresnel believed in a material aether
which was the medium of light propagation—whether he intended to study aethers, or action-at-
a-distance, etc.—is irrelevant to the robustness of his laws throughout history.4 Putnam needed to
borrow from the worldview image of science in order to combat a pessimistic reading of the history
of science. Structuralists need not.
In order to maintain its distance from a holistic worldview image of science, SR needs to ﬁnd
a contemporary understanding of “ scientiﬁc structure” which can be applied to past theories, and
then show that such structures survived “radical” theory change, such as Kuhn’s scientiﬁc revolu-
tions. Structuralists do not need their notion of structure to be possibly-acceptable to long-dead
scientists. As such, they do not need to rely on the sort of transhistorical philosophical commit-
ments to which Putnam appealed. Posit for the moment that the historical case for continuity of
structure can be made. The force of Laudan’s PMI rests on a twentieth-century formulation of
scientiﬁc theories as logical/linguistic entities. Any anti-realist who accepts a pessimistic induction
3. Over time, Worrall has framed SR as more or less dependent or independent on scientists’ mindset. This is related to
his view of the importance of novel predictions in the acceptance of scientiﬁc theories. See Brush 2007; Stanford 2003a.
4. It may be that Fresnel’s commitment to the aether helped or hindered the reception of his views. My point here is that
there is a historical fact of the matter that Fresnel’s Laws were part of the “mature” science of optics from the 1820s, across
the modern abandonment of the material aether, to today. Jed Buchwald’s detailed study of this period places the emphasis
away from abstract theories, and toward concepts and methods which were closer to experimental practice: Buchwald 1989,
1992.
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which is based on contemporary philosophy of science must also accept an optimistic induction
which is based on contemporary philosophy of science (cf. Worrall 1994). This also applies to
term-reference critiques which are not “inductions” (Feyerabend 1962; Ladyman and Ross 2007,
91-93). Even the most committed, holistic, worldview-based critique cannot contest that historical
arguments are structured by the era in which they were written (Biagioli 1996; Iggers 2005). In
this way, structural realism with a contemporary deﬁnition of structure oﬀers a strong response to
historicist critiques.5
If structures do survive, do they play the same role in contemporary science as in the past?
Many realists are concerned about “fundamental” scientiﬁc entities. In a perceptive critique of
contemporary scientiﬁc realism, P. Kyle Stanford uses an example from Francis Galton’s population
biology to show that a mathematical structure that has survived into modern population generics
did not remain at the centre of the science of inheritance (Stanford 2003b, 571). Stanford is correct
that scientists may change their assessment of a structure’s fundamentality over time. But as long
as the surviving structure is still a part of science—still explains or predicts or synthesizes empirical
results; is still in the textbooks—there is no problem for realism here, per se. If on this basis a
structural realist counts many laws as philosophically fundamental that a scientist would not, I am
willing open this gap between philosophy of science and scientism.6
This paper is dedicated to a philosophical characterization of the structures which survive the-
ory change, using the example of Fresnel’s Laws (FL). The dominant characterization of laws and
structure in the SR literature follows in the Logical Empiricist tradition of universal “exception-
less generalizations”: true laws are true at all scales and at all locations at all times. The model is
Newton’s second law of motion: the force on a body equals its mass multiplied by its acceleration.7
FL are not like this. They refer to speciﬁc arrangements of material: beams of light, polarizations,
and angles of reﬂection from plates of glass. I join Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), Earman,
Roberts, and Smith (2002), and others in distinguishing between this sort of phenomenal law and
more-abstract exceptionless generalizations.
Structuralists tend to either make an unstated inference that the survival of FL supports realism
about all scientiﬁc structures, including universal exceptionless generalizations; or, they assimilate
5. Thus avoiding the trap of realists’ “pyrrhic victories” over historicists, won at the cost of integrating historical attitudes
into realism. Stanford 2003b; cf. Ladyman and Ross 2007, 91.
6. Considering the philosophical implications of historical change is certainly not a scientist’s job. Against Ladyman
and Ross’s avowed scientism, Stanford sees the discovery of the metaphysics of the world as a joint project with scientists,
historians, and philosophers. See Stanford in Stanford et al. 2010.
7. The “structures” and laws which are most commonly invoked in this literature are dynamical ; they relate changes in the
state of being of entities. And they are universal: any entity which counts as an object should follow Newton’s laws. There
are also less-universal generalizations. I.e. ‘light travels at 299000 metres per second in a vacuum.’ This is a ceteris paribus
generalization because it refers to a context of applicability (a vacuum). ‘Atomic oxygen is heavier than atomic hydrogen’ is
a true relation that holds without exception between two speciﬁc kinds of thing. It is not of the same level of generality of
Newton’s laws, or the universal law of gravitation. Nor does it describe a mutual interaction between bodies. Exceptionless
generalizations of this most universal type are traditionally considered the ‘fundamental’ ones (Earman, Roberts, and Smith
2002). Speciﬁc-but-exceptionless generalizations may be closer to ceteris paribus laws, on my account. See section 4. I
thank an anonymous reviewer and Clark Glymour for prompting these comments.
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the survival of FL into an endorsement of the modern electrodynamics of Maxwell’s Equations,
and even quantum electrodynamics (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 284; French 2014, 154). I do not
think this is an acceptable state of aﬀairs. At its most conservative, SR should rest on the belief in
the reality of just those structures which have actually survived theory change. With this narrower
but stronger argument, I would hope to force an anti-realist or constructive empiricist to accept
realism. However, this is rather beyond the scope of this paper.
Here, I propose to analyze FL as ceteris paribus laws, on the model of Nancy Cartwright (1983,
2002). The Laws hold, given certain physical conditions which are speciﬁed by ceteris paribus
clauses. In sections 2–3, I follow the history of FL up to their present place in the ﬁeld of non-
linear optics. FL are still used in physics, but their status has changed in two important ways. First,
I argue that across the transition from aether-theories to modern-theories FL acquired new ceteris
paribus clauses, and some of their ceteris paribus clauses became better speciﬁed. Second, I argue
that the fundamentality of FL shifted. In the nineteenth-century, they were taken to bear on the
fundamental ontology of light and the aether; currently, they are considered “phenomenological”
relations which do not have fundamental, ontological, purchase (to physicists).
However my positive contribution to SR can only come after a correction to the reigning—
badly distorted—image of the history of FL. Section (2) considers the claims of Worrall and Stathis
Psillos about the history of optics and electrodynamics in the context the broad consensus of his-
torians. Worrall presented FL as persisting over the radical ontological change from aether theories
of light to modern theories, without an aether. And there is truth in that. The problem is that he
claimed that light without an aether came about “long before the advent of relativity theory, when
Maxwell’s theory was accepted in its stead” (Worrall 1989b, 116).8 Ladyman (1998) approvingly
cited this in his introduction of OSR, and the claim remains accepted in the literature (Ladyman
and Ross 2007, 88; French 2014, 6). While it is true that many physicists, especially in German
speaking countries, rejected Maxwellian aethers, they did not accept a ﬁeld-propagation model;
rather they opted for action-at-a-distance. But this was not what Worrall had in mind. Regardless,
near the end of the nineteenth century, Heinrich Hertz’s astounding demonstration that electro-
magnetic waves could be created in the laboratory caused a crisis for action-at-a-distance theories
(Hunt 1991; Buchwald 1994). At the ﬁn de siècle, Henrik Lorentz’s aetherial electron theory was
dominant (Hirosige 1969; McCormmach 1970). Historian Olivier Darrigol credits Emil Cohen
with ﬁrst elucidating our modern ﬁeld concept, which was widely known only after 1910 (Darrigol
2000, 260-61, 366). Belief in a material aether-medium was not given up until well after 1905
and Albert Einstein’s (1879–1955) interventions in kinetic theory, electrodynamics, and radiation
theory (Einstein 1998; Schaﬀner 1972; Glick 1987). Well into the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, the aether concept was used in critiques of Einstein’s theories, but it was also incorporated
into them. In 1920, for example, Einstein ([1920] 2007) rejected the possibility that there existed
8. Henri Poincaré discussed the continuity of FL between changes in aether theories. See Connemara Doran, forthcom-
ing, in Navarro 2018.
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a material aether—in the sense of a gas of molecules or an extended solid body—but he argued
that the sense of an aether as signifying that “empty space” had physical properties was deﬁnitely
included in the general theory of relativity. He proposed identifying the aether with the gravi-
tational potential (g). Here, the word ‘aether’ is less important than the underlying physical
concept. Maxwell and his followers may not have been sure about what sort of matter the aether
was, but they were certain that it was some kind of matter. This material aether was rejected by
Einstein, and eventually by the mainstream of modern science.9 In order for FL to have survived
the radical ontological change from aether-theories to non-material-aether-theories, they must be
followed into modern physics. (In the remainder of this paper, I will take ‘aether’ to mean ‘material
aether.’)
In his historical claims, Psillos has returned to a ground of argument which Worrall sought
to avoid: scientists’ intentions. Implausibly, Psillos argues that Maxwell himself thought that one
could study light and electromagnetism without a commitment to an underlying physical medium
(Psillos 1995, 42-44; 1999, 131, 138). This is important for Psillos’s version of scientiﬁc realism
because he relies on scientists to identify those parts of their theories which philosophers should
withhold belief. He made this move as a defence against any charge that a realist simply cooked
up an ad hoc criterion for identifying lasting bits of scientiﬁc theories in their challenge to the PMI
(Psillos 1999, 111-13; Chakravartty 2007, 46; 2014; Stanford 2003b, 561). However, the scholarly
consensus is that while Maxwell held complex and changing views about speciﬁc mechanicalmodels
of the aether, he maintained his commitment to the existence of a material aether (Everitt [1974]
2008; Morrison 1992; Hunt 2014). In section 2 I engage with Psillos’s historical claims directly.
Reception of Psillos’s claim has beenmixed. Marc Lange’s review of Psillos’s Scientiﬁc Realism (1999)
is critical:
It is not the case (contrary to Psillos on p. 137) that Maxwell and his followers took
the electromagnetic ﬁeld as having physical reality independent of its embodiment in
the aether. This came with Einstein (or perhaps Lorentz). (Lange 2001, 319)
Lange’s review was not a full evaluation of these claims. Other reviews assert the opposite, for
example that “[Psillos’s] case studies from 19th century physics are authoritative and new” (Leplin
2000, 980). This paper corrects the record.
Proponents of SR have not embraced ceteris paribus laws (ie. Ladyman and Ross 2007, 256-57,
282-86). I argue that they should. In particular, OSR needs ceteris paribus laws in order to maintain
the coherence of its sense of “structure.” This is one of the most vexed questions for structuralists.
As P. Kyle Stanford addressed it to Ladyman and Don Ross:
9. For recent studies on the range of attitudes and approaches to the aether concept after relativity, see the essays in
Navarro (2018). I thank an anonymous referee for bringing Cordero (2012) to my attention. I agree with his challenges
to those philosophers who would carve up scientiﬁc theories according to ‘idle’ vs ‘explanatory’ posits. And I appreciate his
survey of attitudes to the aether in optics ca. 1900. However, it is a step too far to suggest that a particular stance on the
aether was dominant throughout early twentieth century physics.
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I doubt there is a single kind of structure that is simultaneously recommended to us
by fundamental physical theorizing, preserved in the transitions between all or most
suitably successful scientiﬁc theories, and suﬃcient to answer the realist demand to
genuinely explain the success of our scientiﬁc theories. (Stanford et al. 2010, 164)
I agree with Ladyman and Ross’s reply to Stanford that “this challenge can be met” (Stanford et al.
2010, 184). However, I argue it will require signiﬁcant modiﬁcations to OSR at present. This is
because proponents of OSR have excluded ceteris paribus laws from their deﬁnition of fundamental
“structure.” Ultimately, I would modify Stanford’s desiderata, because what physicists label as
“fundamental” is less important for realism than what philosophers choose to place under that label.
Both the deﬁnition of “structure” and the deﬁnition of “fundamental” need to be independent of
scientists’ opinion if SR is to resist historicism.
A critical evaluation of Fresnel’s Laws in philosophy of science has particular signiﬁcance be-
cause of the singularity of the example within current debates. Contemporary “eliminitavist”
strands of realism recognize the bite of the Pessimistic Metainduction and historical theory change,
and shape their realisms around particular features of science that exhibit continuity over “revo-
lutionary” breaks (Chakravartty 2014). For structure in particular, Fresnel’s Laws are the primary
historical example. Without the bright gleam of Fresnel’s optics, structure can be no “weapon of
the realist” (French 2006).
1.1 Fresnel’s Laws
Before continuing, here is a formal expression of FL. For historical derivations see Fresnel ([1823a]
1866) and Buchwald (1989, 387-394); a contemporary reference is Born and Wolf (1999, §1.5).
In ﬁgure (1), the incident beam of polarized light shines down toward the boundary of two linear
optical media at an angle i to a perpendicular axis (cf. Fresnel [1819] 1866). The result is a
reﬂected beam in Medium 1 with angle R and a refracted (or transmitted) beam propagating in
Medium 2 at angle T . Fresnel wanted expressions for the intensities of the reﬂected and refracted
beams in terms of angles and indices of refraction. His picture of light as aetherial vibrations that
were transverse to the direction of the beam allowed him to combine the physical optics of Snel’s
Law with conservation of des forces vives (slightly-anachronistically: conservation of energy and
momentum). With one orientation of the polarization of light, he found that the intensity, iR, of
the reﬂected beam is given by:
iR =   sin(i) cos(i)  sin(T ) cos(T )
sin(i) cos(i) + sin(T ) cos(T )
: (1)
Similar results can be found for other orientations of the polarizability (cf. Worrall 1989b, 119).
In A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism, Maxwell argued that his theory, with a uniﬁed elec-
tromagnetic and luminiferous aether, agreed with Fresnel’s results (Maxwell [1891] 1954, §797,
445). However, it was Hendrik Antoon Lorentz (1853–1928) who ﬁrst derived Fresnel’s Laws from
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Figure 1: Fresnel’s Incident, Reﬂected, and Refracted beams in linear media, after Chakravartty (2007,
Fig. 2.1). Compare to Fresnel ([1819] 1866, 649). Credit: author.
Maxwell’s theory in 1875 (Hirosige 1969, 160ﬀ; Darrigol 1994, 268-70). In the group of physi-
cists who developed Maxwell’s theories after his death (Hunt 1991), Lorentz is accorded the most
importance: According to Einstein, Lorentz achieved “the most important advance in the theory of
electricity since Maxwell, by taking from ether its mechanical, and from matter its electromagnetic
qualities.” If Lorentz divorced the Maxwellian aether from mechanical qualities, Einstein placed
his Special Theory of Relativity in Lorentz’s lineage: “the whole change in the conception of the
ether which the special theory of relativity brought about, consisted in taking away from the ether
its last mechanical quality, namely, its immobility” (Einstein [1920] 2007, 615). Non-mechanical
aether concepts—as labels for one or another entity in relativistic physics—are invoked to this day
(i.e. Wilczek 2008; cf. Navarro 2018).
2 Philosophy of science with history of science
This section disputes two established claims about the history of nineteenth-century optics in the
philosophy of science literature. They are:
W.1) Long before Einstein’s relativity, the aether was rejected, and
W.2) Maxwell’s electromagnetic ﬁeld was accepted in its place; and
P) Maxwell himself rejected the reality of the aether, or thought that the existence of
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the aether was irrelevant to understanding optical and electromagnetic phenomena.
Aspects of each of these claims can be supported by the historical record. Many natural philosophers
and men of science rejected the luminiferous aether, or various other subtle ﬂuids associated with
electricity, magnetism, and heat (W.1). However, they did not accept Maxwell’s electromagnetic
ﬁeld in the twentieth-century sense (W.2). In fact, the ﬁn de siècle was probably the high point
of aether theory. At the time of Einstein’s work in 1905, the dominant physical picture of light
and electromagnetism was Lorentz’s theory, which construed the aether quite minimally, but which
was an aether-theory nevertheless (Lorentz 1916, 1). On claim (P): Maxwell famously developed
a series of mechanical models of the aether over his career. And he reﬂected on the methodology
of modelling natural phenomena, both in popular works and the details of his scientiﬁc writings.
It has been the broad consensus of historians that throughout his work, Maxwell maintained an
underlying belief in the physical reality of the aether (Everitt [1974] 2008, 213). In fact, Maxwell’s
great accomplishment can be characterized as unifying three subtle ﬂuids into a universal aether for
electricity, magnetism, and light (Schaﬀner 1972, 79; Siegel 1981). There is an extensive literature
on nineteenth-century electromagnetism and optics which supports this analysis.10
On this basis, I conclude that the period from FL for Augustin Fresnel (ca. 1821) to FL in
Maxwell’s theory (derived by Lorentz in 1875) does not span a radical theory change in the sense
of Kuhn’s revolutions. It is only a change among aethers. Therefore, this span is an inappropriate
frame for making arguments for scientiﬁc realism. The appropriate timespan for realist arguments
based on FL extends into contemporary physics, which I sketch in section 3. (Those readers who
are unconcerned with the historical details may jump to section 3 without losing the argument.)
2.1 Pre-modern ﬁelds?
In 1989 Worrall hoped to elucidate a proposal for scientiﬁc realism that captured “the best of
both worlds” presented by realism and antirealism. Realism was supported by the “No Miracles
Argument”; antirealism by an argument from history of scientiﬁc revolutions. Worrall was not
concerned to formalize either side or even pin a picture to a speciﬁc author (Hilary Putnam, say).
In broad strokes he sought to reconcile the general force of each argument by isolating one aspect
of scientiﬁc theories that both survived theory change and made meaningful claims about the
world that one could be a realist about. That aspect was “structure,” which was picked-out by “the
mathematical equations” (Worrall 1989b, 120).
Worrall rejected the suggestion that there is some way of seeing Fresnel as “really” referring
to the modern electromagnetic ﬁeld. Despite the personal inﬂuence of Imre Lakatos, “rational
reconstruction” had its limits. “Fresnel was obviously claiming that the light-carrying ‘luminiferous
aether’ is an elastic solid […]. He was obviously claiming this, and it turned out that, if later
science is right, Fresnel was wrong.” Suggestions to the contrary—suggestions that Fresnel was
10. Inﬂuential works include: Buchwald 1985; Cantor and Hodge 1981; Darrigol 2000, chs. 4-5; Hirosige 1969; Hunt
1991, 2002, 2014; Jungnickel and McCormmach 1986; McCormmach 1970; Schaﬀner 1972; Siegel 1991.
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“really” referring to a modern electromagnetic ﬁeld—had “a deﬁnite air of desparation [sic] about”
them (Worrall 1989b, 117).11
Worrall thought FL survived optical theory change (e.g. Worrall 1989b, 120). But he made a
curious historical statement (with no citations) about which new theory instantiated this change.12
He wrote that Fresnel’s aether was completely overthrown by later science, but that this occurred
before Einstein:
Indeed this occurred, long before the advent of relativity theory, whenMaxwell’s theory
was accepted in its stead. It is true thatMaxwell himself continued to hold out the hope
that his electromagnetic ﬁeld would one day be ‘reduced’ to an underlying mechanical
substratum—essentially the ether as Fresnel had conceived it. But in view of the failure
of a whole series of attempts at such a ‘reduction’, the ﬁeld was eventually accepted as
a primitive entity. (Worrall 1989b, 116; compare Worrall 1994, esp. 340-41)
But it was not the case that the electromagnetic ﬁeld was widely accepted as primitive before Ein-
stein.13 And this discussion of ‘reduction’ is confused.
At no point between Maxwell’s 1860s electrodynamics and Einstein’s annus mirabilis in 1905
was there a consensus among physicists to abandon the aether and take up a self-subsistent electro-
magnetic ﬁeld (an authoritative survey is Darrigol 2000). Hertz famously produced electric waves
in his laboratory in 1888, conﬁrming a prediction that Maxwell’s followers had developed from
electrodynamics (Buchwald 1994; Hunt 1991).14 That year, the Maxwellian George F. FitzGerald
(1851–1901) gave a triumphal presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement
of Science:
just as [Thomas] Young’s and Fresnel’s researches on the interference of light prove
the undulatory theory of optics, so Hertz’s experiment proves the ethereal theory of
electro-magnetism. It is a splendid result. Henceforth I hope no learner will fail to be
impressed with the theory—hypothesis no longer—that electromagnetic actions are
due to a medium pervading all known space, and that it is the same medium as the
one by which light is propagated; […]. (FitzGerald [1888] 1902, 237)
The greatest triumph ofMaxwell’s theory was unquestionably seen as a triumph of an aether theory.
This was the height of aether theory.
True, British aether theories were not universally accepted in this period. Maxwell’s Treatise
was widely regarded as impenetrable, on both sides of the English Channel (Maxwell [1891] 1954;
Warwick 2003, ch. 6). Those Continental European physicists who rejected the British aether
11. Others disagree: Psillos 1999, Ch. 12.
12. The issue here is the career of FL after their inventor’s early death, at age 39, in 1827. Worrall does accurately cite the
primary source literature on Fresnel, particularly in his work on novel predictions. Worrall 1989a, 1994.
13. It may be possible to construct a more-abstract notion of “ﬁeld” to draw out historical continuities, but that is not
my concern here. Stein 1970.
14. On Hertz, John Mulligan (2001) has argued that he “retained his conviction of the aether’s existence until his death
on January 1, 1894” (157).
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also rejected British ﬁelds, and worked toward action-at-a-distance reformulations of Maxwell’s
theories: most prominently Wilhelm Weber and Hermann Helmholtz (Maxwell [1891] 1954, II,
Ch. XXIII; Buchwald 1994; Hirosige 1969, 160-67). At the level of sub-disciplines: from the
1830s to 1890s, German optics research worked in a tradition of an elastic aether (Jungnickel and
McCormmach 1986, II. 103-4). One exceptional individual was Cohen, a German Maxwellian,
who judged the aether to be superﬂuous in 1900. Darrigol credits him with our contemporary
grammar of “ﬁeld” and “propagation” (Darrigol 2000, 260-61, 366). There were physicists who
challenged Maxwell’s theories and aether, but because they did not represent a consensus, and
because they did not endorse a self-subsistent electromagnetic ﬁeld, their views do not support
Worrall’s historical claims (W.1-2).
The electromagnetic ﬁeld did gain signiﬁcant independence in Lorentz’s mature work. TetuHi-
rosige argues that over Lorentz’s career, he turned away from his two main inﬂuences—Maxwellian
aether-dynamics and Weberian action-at-a-distance. In Lorentz’s mature electron theory (1890-
1928) Hirosige accepts Einstein’s 1920 picture of Lorentz’s work: that Lorentz removed all phys-
icality from the aether, except its status as an absolute frame of reference (Hirosige 1969, 152;
Einstein [1920] 2007; cf. Chalmers 2001, 435). This, Hirosige argues, made the electromagnetic
ﬁeld a self-subsistent entity (alongside the aether). For assessing Worrall’s two-part claim, this may
fulﬁll the requirement of an aether-independent electromagnetic ﬁeld (W.2). Lorentz’s work was
more co-extant than “long before” Einstein’s relativity; however, what is more important is that this
independent ﬁeld was co-extant with the aether. As such, Lorentz’s work was not on the other side
of a “revolutionary” or “radical” ontological break. And continuity on both sides of such a break
is what realists need. As such, Hirosige’s interpretation of Lorentz’s work does not save Worrall’s
argument. (And while Lorentz’s view was inﬂuential, diverse attitudes to the aether persisted.) In
fact the aether persisted long after a Bern patent clerk declared it unnecessary; particularly at Cam-
bridge, Maxwell’s heirs gave relativity a rocky reception, at least through 1914 (Warwick 2003, Ch.
8, esp. 424-28).
Lorentz’s work also shifted the electromagnetic ﬁeld from fundamental status.15 Prior to this,
the ﬁeld represented the physical state of a fundamental entity in the world, the aether. Lorentz gave
the ﬁeld an independence from the aether. He was the paradigmatic aether theorist, who advocated
an electromagnetic worldview, “[t]he simplest version of [which] held that electric particles are
merely structures in the ether and that therefore the ether is the sole reality” (McCormmach 1970,
459). In retrospect, Lorentz’s separation of the electromagnetic ﬁeld and the aether was salutary. At
the turn of the nineteenth century, the electromagnetic ﬁeld had secondary ontological status: for
Maxwellians, it was the state of motion of the aether, for Lorentz it was produced by singularities
in the aether, such as the newly-discovered electron.
More than a question for theorists, the aether was also taken as physically real by experimen-
talists. Famously, Albert Michelson and Edward Morley (1887) performed experiments “On the
15. I thank Michael Friedman for making this point.
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Relative Motion of the Earth and the Luminiferous Ether.” In fact, Michelson had read Maxwell’s
argument that Earth-bound experiments were too crude to measure the eﬀect of the motion of the
aether on light. Maxwell argued that astronomical measurements were the only option. Michel-
son took that as a challenge to his terrestrial-instrument-making skills (Everitt [1974] 2008, 215).
Worrall’s view of an aetherless turn of the century conﬂicts with our knowledge of experimental
measurements of the eﬀects of the aether, and their reception (Staley 2008).16 My point is simply
that these turn-of-the-century physicists believed in an aether enough to try to measure its eﬀects.
If arguments (W.1-2) were correct, Michelson and Morley should have already rejected the aether
and accepted a self-subsistent electromagnetic ﬁeld; they would have felt no attraction to aetherial
observations as a proving ground for their instruments.17
A possible source of confusion is revealed in Worrall’s description of Maxwell’s work in terms
of an “electromagnetic ﬁeld [which] would one day be ‘reduced’ to an underlying mechanical sub-
stratum” (Worrall 1989b, 116). Maxwell could not have hoped that the “electromagnetic ﬁeld”
would be “reduced” to an aether—forMaxwell, circa 1865, the physical “ﬁeld”was space ﬁlled with
aetherial matter. (The English sense of “ﬁeld” here is of an area or region, as in “ﬁeld of battle,”
“athletic ﬁeld,” etc. Compare to the French le champ or German das Feld.) This usage probably
originated two decades earlier with Michael Faraday (Darrigol 2000, 98). In later usage, Maxwell
considered the electromagnetic ﬁeld to specify the state of the aether (see below). “For him [the
ﬁeld] was not an independent dynamical reality, but one of the mechanical states of a material
substance” (Hirosige 1969, 156). Maxwell and his followers believed in matter and the aether, and
employed a variety of models of it, and concepts which applied to it. According to Lorentz’s 1906
lectures on electron theory at Columbia University, his audience knew
this theory of Maxwell, which we may call the general theory of the electromagnetic
ﬁeld, and in which we constantly have in view the state of the matter or the medium
by which the ﬁeld is occupied. (Lorentz 1916, 1)
Lorentz presented the electrodynamic ﬁeld as a space which was “occupied” by aetherial matter;
Maxwell’s “ﬁeld” theory was about the state of this matter in this space. Maxwell did not conceive
of the electromagnetic ﬁeld as an entity—as Worrall would have it—which could be reduced to
further, more fundamental, entities. Over time, he considered the ﬁeld to be a region, and then to
be a characterization of the aetherial matter in a region. Neither of these could be “reduced” to a
molecular or ﬂuid aether (in the sense in which Maxwell worked to reduce thermodynamics to the
kinetic theory of gases).
16. The aether drift experiments were unrelated to the origin of relativity. See Hirosige 1976; Holton 1988.
17. For later aether experiments see Schirrmacher and Lalli in Navarro 2018.
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2.2 Maxwell against the aether?
Worrall’s picture of an aether-ambivalent Maxwell is common in the contemporary realism litera-
ture. A recent eﬀort to “reconsider” the transition from Fresnel to Maxwell takes “Maxwell” from
the current graduate course standard: J. D. Jackson’s (1998) Classical Electrodynamics (Saatsi 2005).
This anachronism was bolstered by Psillos’s (1995, 1999) critique of structural realism and “stan-
dard” realist proposal. While there have been eﬀorts to contest Psillos’s depiction of past science,
none has directly challenged his speciﬁc textual claims on Maxwell (Lange 2001; Chang 2003;
Stanford 2003a).
It is necessary to correct the record. The main focus of my philosophical arguments is SR, not
Psillos’s “standard” realism. However, he has been a major interlocutor in debates over structural-
ism, and so a detailed discussion is warranted.
In his arguments, Psillos cites some source material from Maxwell, however I argue he misin-
terprets it. From Maxwell’s 1878 Encyclopeadia Brittanica entry “Ether,” Psillos concludes that
the upshot ofMaxwell’s point is that we can scientiﬁcally study and discover facts about
the physical process of the propagation of light without being initially committed to
any physical quantity as constituting light. (Psillos 1995, 43)18
He argued that Maxwell shared Worrall’s eliminativist insight, that ontological commitments to
scientiﬁc work need not be holistic (Psillos 1995, 44; cf. Psillos 2006, 567).
Before specifying the nature of Psillos’s error about Maxwell, here is the general tenor of the
encyclopedia entry which Psillos cites, from its introduction and conclusion. While earlier aether
theories had been imagined, Maxwell thought they failed because they
could not specify the nature of the motion of these media […]. The only aether which
has survived is that which was invented by [Christiaan] Huygens to explain the prop-
agation of light. (Maxwell [1878] 1890, emphasis added, 764)
In concluding his discussion of whether the aether is molecular or was made up of vortices of a
continuous ﬂuid, Maxwell turned his attention skyward:
Whatever diﬃculties we may have in forming a consistent idea of the constitution of
the aether, there can be no doubt that the interplanetary and interstellar spaces are not
empty, but are occupied by a material substance or body. (Maxwell [1878] 1890, 775)
Maxwell’s intervening discussion does not contradict his commitment to the aether. In fact, this
sentence captures Maxwell’s general view: though there were debates over the form of the aether, he
had “no doubt” that one existed (Everitt [1974] 2008, 213). Maxwell wrote this Brittanica article
at the height of his powers, as Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics at Cambridge, while
he was revising a second edition of A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism. (His death in 1879, at
age 48, was due to cancer.) Here, I am making the most conservative form of historical argument.
18. Psillos misattributes Maxwell’s entry to the publication date of Maxwell’s 1890 Scientiﬁc Papers.
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Maxwell wrote an article on the aether, in which he wrote that he had no doubt about the existence
of an aether—my argument is: believe him.
Returning to Psillos’s treatment, he claims thatMaxwell “distinguished between the geometrical
character of the process of light-propagation and the nature of the physical quantity that constitutes
light” (Psillos 1995, 42). This exhibits a similar confusion toWorrall’s statements about “reduction”
(sec. 2.1). Here is what Maxwell wrote about the constitution of light: he argued that light could
not be a substance itself because interference patterns show that under certain circumstances light
can destroy itself. “Now, we cannot suppose that two bodies when put together can annihilate
each other; therefore light cannot be a substance” (Maxwell [1878] 1890, 764). In his text, Psillos
followsMaxwell as he develops “vibratory” quantities that couldmathematically characterize optical
interference. However he skips Maxwell’s deﬁnitions. “Such quantities are the measures, not of
substances, but always of processes taking place in a substance. We therefore conclude that light
is not a substance but a process going on in a substance” (Maxwell [1878] 1890, 764-5). This
substance was the aether. Contra Psillos, Maxwell does not distinguish between a “process of light-
propagation” and a “physical quantity that constitutes light.” For Maxwell, quantities did not
constitute anything—they were measures—and light just was a process within the aether.
In his entry, Maxwell presented a number of possible forms of the aether, each with its own
quantity. This quantity “may be [1] a displacement, [2] or a rotation, or [3] an electrical distur-
bance, or [4] indeed any physical quantity which is capable of assuming negative as well as positive
values” (Maxwell [1878] 1890, 765-6). Psillos interprets this as indicating the independence of
Maxwell’s analysis from the underlying physical picture (Psillos 1995, 43-44; 1999, 113, 139).
But it is important to distinguish the variety of models of the aether from the existence of the
aether itself. In my view, this list of quantities should be read as a pedagogical statement that set
up the remainder of Maxwell’s entry. As it progressed, he introduced a series of experimental results
and theories to further specify the relationship of light and aether. Fresnel believed in displacements
of aetherial particles [1]; Maxwell had developed a theory of rotations of vortices in the 1860s [2];
Maxwell’s uniﬁcation of electricity, magnetism, and optics introduced electrical disturbances [3];
and Maxwell’s mature work used very general speciﬁcations of material substances [4] (Lagrangian
mechanics). The fact that Maxwell listed the various strands of aether-theory at the beginning of
an encyclopedia entry should not be taken as evidence that Maxwell thought physical facts could
be discovered apart from, or prior to, physical reality. But even if Psillos’s reading of this sentence
could be reasonably entertained, Maxwell was still referring to diﬀerent processes within the aether.
He should be read: light “may be a displacement [of the aether], or a rotation [of the aether], or an
electrical disturbance [of the aether], or indeed any physical quantity [of the aether].” This reading
is substantiated when Maxwell next “turn[ed his] attention to the medium in which it takes place.
We may use the term aether to denote this medium, whatever it may be” (Maxwell [1878] 1890,
767). In diﬀerent periods, Maxwell was agnostic about the correct model of the aether, but he did
not express an atheism about the aether itself. Nor did he argue that the properties of the aether
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could be studied without believing in the existence of an aether.
The increasing generality over time of Maxwell’s approach matched the generality of his math-
ematical methods: his Lagrangian mechanics accommodated multiple speciﬁc models of material,
energy- andmomentum-carrying aethers(cf. Stein 1989, 61-63; Psillos 1999, 139-40). In compar-
ison to Newton’s agnosticism (in print) over the cause of gravity—hypothesis non ﬁngo—Maxwell
was much more invested in underlying causes and entities. Daniel Siegel characterized Maxwell’s
new general mathematics as a “tactical retreat,” in which Maxwell gave up the battle on a speciﬁc
aether model in order to win the war for an aether against the action-at-a-distance theorists (Siegel
1981, 259). Alan Chalmers argues that Maxwell’s tactics were imperfect, and that his Lagrangian
methods failed to eliminate hidden mechanisms from electromagnetic theory (Chalmers 2001).
According to Bruce Hunt, in this period “Maxwell still believed in a mechanical ether, but until
more light could be shed on the details of its substructure, he thought it best to formulate his
theory with a minimum of conjecture” (Hunt 2002, 318). Maxwell’s method in the Treatise (ﬁrst
edition 1873) required only that the aether be a general material, capable of storing energy and
propagating waves under energy conservation (Buchwald 1985, 20-40). These are general require-
ments for a substance. Contra Psillos, Maxwell’s general mathematical methods were predicated on
the existence of a substantial aetherial medium.
Psillos’s second example of a self-subsistent electromagnetic ﬁeld in his (1995) calls attention
to Maxwell’s 1864 argument before the Royal Society that “light itself is an electromagnetic dis-
turbance in the form of waves propagated through the electromagnetic ﬁeld according to electro-
magnetic laws” (the paper was published in 1865. Psillos 1995, 43). That is correct. But it only
suggests an autonomous ﬁeld when read with contemporary vocabulary and when read without the
rest of Maxwell’s text. “A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field” was “called aDynamical
Theory, because it assumes that in that space [near electric and magnetic bodies] there is matter
in motion.” Maxwell arrayed himself against Weber’s action-at-a-distance theory, and argued for
a “surrounding medium” that mediated electrical phenomena. Here is how Maxwell deﬁned the
electromagnetic ﬁeld on the second page of his paper:
The electromagnetic ﬁeld is that part of space which contains and surrounds bodies in
electric or magnetic conditions.
It may be ﬁlled with any kind of matter, or we may endeavour to render it empty of
all gross matter, as in the case of Geissler’s tubes and other so-called vacua.
There is always, however, enough of matter left to receive and transmit the undulations
of light and heat, and it is because the transmission of these radiations is not greatly
altered when transparent bodies of measurable density are substituted for the so-called
vacuum, that we are obliged to admit that the undulations are those of an aethereal
substance, and not of the gross matter, the presence of which merely modiﬁes in some
way the motion of the aether.
We have therefore some reason to believe, from the phenomena of light and heat, that
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there is an aethereal medium ﬁlling space and permeating bodies, capable of being set
in motion and of transmitting that motion from one part to another, and of com-
municating that motion to gross matter so as to heat it and aﬀect it in various ways.
(Maxwell 1865, 460)
In this paper Maxwell deﬁned the electromagnetic ﬁeld as a region of space ﬁlled with an aether.
Waves travelling through the “electromagnetic ﬁeld” were travelling through the aether-ﬁlled space
surrounding charges and magnets. Recalling earlier generations of debates between vacuists and
plenists (Grant 1981, Ch. 4; Shapin and Schaﬀer 1985), Maxwell rejected “so-called vacua,” and
supported the existence of the aether with the facts of heat and light transmission through glass
Geissler tubes (see also Hirosige 1969, 154-55). Psillos claims that Fresnel’s “luminiferous aether”
and Maxwell’s “electromagnetic ﬁeld” referred to the same entity (Psillos 1999, 293-300). This is
plausible because Maxwell’s “ﬁeld” referred to space ﬁlled with aether (ca. 1865) or the state of
motion of the aether (ca. 1876). But Maxwell’s “ﬁeld” was not the same thing as our modern self-
subsistent electromagnetic “ﬁeld.” One simply cannot read our modern relativistic electrodynamics
backward to Maxwell; in the mid-nineteenth century, the electromagnetic ﬁeld was an aetherial
region, not a self-subsistent entity.
Psillos also discusses Maxwell’s optics in his Scientiﬁc Realism (Psillos 1999, 112-14, 130-40).
Similarly to his analysis of Maxwell’s “Ether” encyclopedia article (moderated somewhat on pp.
160-61), Psillos confuses cautious statements about speciﬁc models for rejection of any aether at
all.19 In his 1861 paper “On Physical Lines of Force,” Maxwell discussed his famous vortex and
idle-wheel model of the aether (idle wheels are similar to ball bearings). As part of that discussion,
Maxwell wrote: “I do not bring it forward as a mode of connexion existing in nature.” According to
Psillos, “it” referred to Maxwell’s “model,” which Psillos implies includes the famous vortices, the
idle-wheels, and the aether itself (Psillos 1999, 138). But it is clear that this is not what Maxwell
meant. He was not referring to the aether, nor to vortices. The “mode of connexion” was the “per-
fect rolling contact” without slippage that Maxwell assumed to hold between vortices and wheels
(Siegel 1991, 41; Hunt 2002, 317-18; 2014, 306-8). Here is the preceding sentence: “The con-
ception of a particle having its motion connected with that of a vortex by perfect rolling contact
may appear somewhat awkward. I do not […]” (Maxwell 1861a, 346).
It is appropriate to end with Maxwell’s own words. At the conclusion of his Treatise, he con-
sidered the objections to his aether theory by action-at-a-distance theorists. Maxwell rejected
mathematical entities such as Gauss’s electrodynamic action and Neumann’s immaterial poten-
tial. The fundamental fact was that light propagates and electrical and magnetic forces propagate.
For Maxwell,
we are unable to conceive of propagation in time, except either as the ﬂight of a material
substance through space, or as the propagation of a condition of motion or stress in a
19. Psillos also claims the pre-Maxwellian work of George Green, James MacCullagh, and George Stokes as non-aetherial.
All of these men proposed aether theories. See Schaﬀner 1972, esp. 59-68; Darrigol 2000, esp. 190-92.
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medium already existing in space.
Any attempt to mathematically describe this propagation must suppose there is some matter there.
For if what propagates is Neumann’s potential energy “how are we to conceive this energy as existing
in a point of space, coinciding neither with the one particle nor the other?
In fact, whenever energy is transmitted from one body to another in time, there must
be a medium or substance in which the energy exists after it leaves one body and before
it reaches the other […].
On the penultimate page, Maxwell admitted that Newton was correct to abjure the multiple aethers
of the seventeenth century, “the properties of which were invented merely to ‘save appearances’
[…].” But with Maxwell’s argument that his own electrodynamics and his Continental rivals’ the-
ories all “lead to the conception of a medium in which the propagation takes place,” he concluded
volume II:
and if we admit this medium as an hypothesis [contra Newton], I think it ought to
occupy a prominent place in our investigations, and that we ought to endeavour to
construct a mental representation of all the details of its action, and this has been my
constant aim in this treatise. (Maxwell [1891] 1954, II: 492-93; cf. Maxwell 1861b,
162; cf. Everitt [1974] 2008, 213)
2.3 Conclusion
There are legitimate ambiguities in the corpus of Maxwell’s statements about the aether, and the
diﬀerent threads of his views: on the existence of the aether; on the propriety of speciﬁc models of
the aether; and on the limits of human understanding (Everitt [1974] 2008, 213). Philosophers
have focused onMaxwell’s use of models (Morrison 1992; Cat 2001; Chalmers 2001). In his long-
standing Dictionary of Scientiﬁc Biography entry for Maxwell, the physicist and historian C. W. F.
Everitt writes that
Maxwell’s statements about the luminiferous ether have an ambiguity which needs
double care in view of the intellectual confusion of much twentieth-century comment
on the subject […] the best short statement ofMaxwell’s position is that wemay believe
in the existence of the ether without direct knowledge of its properties. (Everitt [1974]
2008, 213)
This is roughly opposite to Psillos’s position, which is that Maxwell inferred from his inability
to precisely model the aether that the aether did not exist, or was irrelevant to electrodynamical
research (Psillos 1995, 43). Hunt’s authoritative overview of this period notes that Maxwell’s uni-
ﬁcation of electricity, magnetism and light was a uniﬁcation of aethers, not an elimination of all
aethers (Hunt 2002, 317; Maxwell 1890, 500; also Siegel 1981, 254). Siegel has given a close
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reading of Maxwell’s evolving electrodynamics that supports this dominant position among histo-
rians (Siegel 1991). Maxwell’s drive toward uniﬁcation was strongly connected to his devotion to
evangelical Christianity; and his religiosity informed his view of the limits of human knowledge
(Stanley 2012, 2015). Despite the complexities of Maxwell’s life and work, it is the scholarly con-
sensus that Maxwell maintained his belief in the aether throughout his career. This is supported
by careful but plain readings of his published work.
With this historical record corrected, I now return to Structural Realism itself. Does this his-
tory aﬀect a structural realist’s philosophical conclusions about Fresnel’s Laws? Yes. According to
Worrall, in order to be a meaningful response to the challenge of major (or ontological, or revo-
lutionary) theory change, the stability of FL needs to be seen across such a change (Worrall 1989b,
esp. 115-17). The passage from Fresnel’s elastic aether to Maxwell’s vortex aether; to FitzGerald’s
“paddlewheel” or later “wheel and band” aether (1882–85); to Lodge’s “cogwheel” aether (1888);
or to Poynting’s “turbine and spring” aether (1893) (Hunt 1991); or even to Lorentz’s stationary
aether, was much smoother and more incremental than the sudden revolutionary breaks that Kuhn
saw as analogous to gestalt switches.
Of course if there was ever a theoretical break it came with Einstein’s relativity. Could Worrall
and contemporary structuralists simply push the timing of their analysis into the twentieth century?
Don’t we use FL today? Yes and yes. The problem for the realist is that in 1905 Einstein’s three
papers both ushered in a theoretical break in electrodynamics and set in motion the dethroning
of FL from their position of ontological importance. Einstein’s contributions to quantum theory
combined with relativity to undermine FL’s fundamentality, their ontological purchase (Einstein
1998).
3 Today’s view
While Fresnel’s Laws remain a standard part of the physical science curriculum, their stature is
far from what it once was. The successes of Fresnel’s physical optics no longer warrants belief in
a luminiferous aether. Standard physical optics is seen as “phenomenological” physics that does
not speak to fundamental questions at all. Part of the reason for this is atomism: the refractive
index of bulk glass or quartz is seen as an average eﬀect of more fundamental interactions. The
larger reason is that FL and classical optics are empirically inadequate to describe the phenomena
which manifests these atomic characteristics, such as the refraction of high-energy light (X-rays,
etc.). Spurred by observations of intense laser light at the University of Michigan in 1961, the
ﬁeld of nonlinear optics has superseded classical (linear) optics as a candidate for understanding
the interaction of light and matter (Bromberg 1991).
The fact that classical optical equations have limited applicability is not new to the philosophy
of science literature. It was highlighted by Cartwright in a classic paper in 1980 (reprinted 1983), in
the context of ceteris paribus laws. Cartwright used Snel’s law as her motivating example, explaining
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that it only holds in linear media and quoting an optics text to the eﬀect that in nonlinear media
there will be two refracted beams (compare ﬁg. 1) (Cartwright 1980, 160).
Fresnel’s equations are built through combining the law of reﬂection, the conservation of en-
ergy, and Snel’s law of refraction. Fresnel developed these equations and experimental apparatuses
(with his friend François Arago) to study the properties of polarized light. He eventually proposed
that the vibrations of the luminiferous aether that constituted light occurred only at right angles to
the direction of transmission. This picture of aetherial molecules vibrating orthogonally to the path
of a beam of light had empirical successes and ontological signiﬁcance (Buchwald 1989). It was
taken to support Huygen’s hypothesis that light was a phenomena of vibrations in a luminiferous
aether (against Newton’s corpuscular hypothesis). Figure 1 is a diagram of Fresnel’s process, made
after Chakravartty (2007, Fig. 2.1).
In the ﬁrst instance, FL are not universally applicable in the same manner as Newton’s law of
gravitation. There must be an interface between two media for light to reﬂect and refract. Not
any medium will do. For example, if the medium is birefringent the refracted beam will depend
on the orientation of the medium. Fresnel himself was steeped in experience with birefringent
materials—before he invented his own polarizer (Fresnel’s rhomb) he used them to generate polar-
ized light in his own research (See Buchwald 1989, 223) and continued to use them as an object
of study into the 1820s. Despite these conditions, FL were taken to bear on ontological questions
in the nineteenth-century—as evidence for a molecular luminiferous aether. As Cartwright (1980)
mentioned, for the equations of classical optics to hold, the materials under study must be linear
(160). In the case of nonlinear media, and also in the case of very high-energy light, the departure
from Fresnel’s picture is dramatic (ﬁg. 2).
A little formalism will elucidate the situation. In standard linear optics, the polarization of a
medium, P , is related to the applied optical electric ﬁeld, E, by the susceptibility (1):
P = (1)E (2)
This can be generalized to arbitrary orders in a power series expansion:
P = (1)E + (2)E2 + (3)E3 +    (3)
in which the terms (2) and (3) are the nonlinear second- and third-order optical susceptibili-
ties. These terms are directly related to a material’s refractive index n and give rise to qualitative
and quantitative diﬀerences between linear and nonlinear optics. Some eﬀects only manifest in
materials with particular symmetry properties, but others—those related to (3)—arise in normal
materials such as glass (Boyd 2003, 2–3).
A nonlinear medium is characterized by an index of refraction n = n0 + n, where n0 is the
normal contribution to n and n is the non-linear contribution. In an analogous case to Fresnel’s
(and Chakravartty’s) in ﬁgure (1): when the second medium is nonlinear, qualitative and quanti-
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Figure 2: Nonlinear Optics at an Interface, after Boyd 2003, Fig. 2.11.2(a). Credit: author.
tative diﬀerences arise, depicted in Fig. (2). Most dramatically, the (2) term has created a second
beam of light (with double the frequency of the original beam), labelled “second-harmonic wave.”
For Fresnel, the index of refraction characterized the diﬀerence between the speeds of propagation
of light in two media, and relied on Snel’s Law (Fresnel [1823a] 1866, 757). In this case, because
of the nonlinear term in the refractive index, n, there is a nonlinear generalization of Snel’s law
(Boyd 2003, §2.11, 117–122).
But in fact we need not start oﬀ with comparatively exotic nonlinear media to observe these
eﬀects. In many materials the index of refraction is dependent on the intensity of the incident light,
so that the nonlinear contribution to the refractive index is n = 2njEj2, with n a constant andE
the electric ﬁeld strength (Boyd 2003, Ch. 4, “Intensity-Dependent Refractive Index,” 189–235).
For example, eﬀects due to the (3) term in P (eq. 3) can be observed in air, water, ethanol, and
many glasses (including SiO2, standard glass). This is to say that if the incident light is intense
enough—whether a laser or highly focused sunlight—FL are inadequate, and no simple relations
of approximation or correspondence obtain. For example, because beam splitting is qualitatively
diﬀerent from the phenomena FL describe, there is no simple sense in which the older relations are
retained as a limiting case of the new.20 Formally, FL, eq. 1, relate the properties of three beams—
20. This change occurs regardless of the birefringence of the material, or lack thereof. As Landau and Lifshits put it, “small
non-linear corrections to D(E) [the relation of electric ﬁeld induction D and electric ﬁeld intensity E] cause qualitatively
new eﬀects” (Landau and Lifshits 1984, 372).
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incident, reﬂected, and transmitted. In order to be empirically adequate to describe beam-splitting
phenomena, an entire set of new intensities and angles for the fourth beam would need to be added.
Adding new variables to an equation is a qualitative change in the equation, a change of form.
Einstein’s 1905 papers began the revolutionary theory change that structural realists need FL to
survive. Einsteinian electrodynamics reformulatedMaxwell’s equations and made the luminiferous
aether superﬂuous. The transition (Fresnel!Maxwell) was still (aether! aether), but (Fresnel!
Einstein) gives (aether! ﬁeld). At the same time, Einstein’s atomism changed the status of FL: they
could no longer be fundamental in a simple sense. Any reference to bulk properties of matter would
now be considered secondary to a particulate analysis. The photoelectric eﬀect compounded this
non-fundamental status by connecting the interaction of light and matter to quantum theory. In
addition to this changing fundamentality, FL were discovered to apply in more limited situations.
But the brute speciﬁcation of some ceteris paribus clauses have been made more-precise through
appeals to modern theories of light and matter. I will now characterize this historical process as
adding new ceteris paribus clauses to the Laws (relating to the types of media of propagation and
the intensity of the incident light).
4 Ceteris paribus
Fresnel’s Laws were part of a theory with fundamental importance in the 1820s, and they were a
key aspect of successful novel predictions of the behaviour of polarized light (Worrall 1989a, 1994).
They were not, however, universal “exceptionless generalization” laws in the sense of Hempel and
Oppenheim (1948) or Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002). FL applied to only particular beams
of light in particular physical situations. In 1823, neither were they a specialization of such a
universal “covering” law to speciﬁc circumstances (Nagel 1961). (Though, as discussed above, in
1875 Lorentz succeeded in deriving the Laws fromMaxwellian electrodynamics and Lorentz’s own
theory of the aether within solid matter.) In this section, I will describe them as ceteris paribus laws,
and situate them within recent debates on whether ceteris paribus laws are properly laws of nature
at all. My purpose here is not to criticize the analysis of laws of nature in terms of “exceptionless
generalizations” per se. Authors such as Hempel and Nagel in particular emphasized that they were
studying the “logic of scientiﬁc explanation” and not necessarily scientiﬁc metaphysics. My concern
is for a picture of laws of nature that is adequate to scientiﬁc realism as a “metaphysical hypothesis”
(see Psillos 2005).
At present, there are two competing views on what makes a given expression a “ceteris paribus
law.” There is general agreement that they are not universal exceptionless generalizations, but
there are disputes about less-abstract laws. For example, is an exceptionless generalization which
has been speciﬁed to a particular physical application a “ceteris paribus law”? Or only a law with a
theoretically-removable “proviso” (after Hempel 1988)? Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002) char-
acterize ceteris paribus laws as laws with speciﬁcations which cannot be removed, even in principle.
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Cartwright’s response to this analysis is that she does not recognize the targets of her own work
in those unruly, ineliminable, clauses (Cartwright 2002). In my analysis of FL, I ﬁnd that they
are ceteris paribus laws in the sense closer to Cartwright’s. They do not have ineliminable ceteris
paribus clauses. My aim here is not to confront SR with Cartwright’s full ontological picture of a
“dappled world” with causal powers or dispositions (Cartwright 1999). Rather, it is to confront
SR with a diﬀerent picture of structure. As such, I have chosen to focus on the trenchant and
revealing analysis of the clauses themselves provided by Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002) and
Earman and Roberts (1999), which has been endorsed by structuralists (Ladyman and Ross 2007,
with Spurrett, 283).
The Laws themselves (eq. 1), are equations with arguments corresponding to the angles, , at
which light approaches, reﬂects, and refracts (is transmitted) from the barrier between two isotropic
(not birefringent) media; the index of refraction, n, of those media; the intensity, i, of the beams
of light; and the plane of polarization of the incident light, S (Fresnel [1823b] 1866). A schematic
of this is presented in table (1). A direct connection to the aether is in Fresnel’s interpretation
of intensity, i, as the amplitude of the vibrations of molecules of aether.21 However, the struc-
tural realist should hope to cut the chain of scientiﬁc inference from this structure before reaching
that now-discredited entity. SR has since become more nuanced, but “structure” has been parsed
simply as the referent of “the mathematical equations” (Worrall 1989b, 120). I am widening that
prescription to include ceteris paribus clauses. In parallel to Cartwright’s (1980) discussion of Snel’s
law—in view of table (1)—I characterize FL as laws that only hold ceteris paribus: they hold so
long as the conditions obtain. When considering the expression of FL, we should include not only
the formula, eq. 1, but also include these ceteris paribus clauses.
Relations Arguments Conditions
Fresnel’s equations ; n; i; S ﬂat boundary between media
9=;ca.1820
9>>>>=>>>>;modern
media are isotropic
light is polarized
media are linear
intensity not too high
Table 1: Table depicting the elements necessary for Fresnel’s Laws to have physical sense and accuracy.
(This already assumes that FL can be meaningfully isolated from the broader contexts of Fresnel’s wave
theory or Maxwellian’s electrodynamics.)
21. I read Fresnel’s molécules éthérées as a speciﬁc aether model, as compared to a continuous ﬂuid or solid (cf. Psillos
1999, 158).
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4.1 Legal distinctions
Earman and Roberts (1999) think that the only true laws of nature are exceptionless generaliza-
tions of fundamental physics. They formulate these generalizations as counterfactuals, in idealized
situations: were modern relativistic electrodynamics to be true, in ﬂat spacetime, then a true law
would be: “that the curl of the E ﬁeld is proportional to the partial time derivative of the B ﬁeld,
etc.,” one of Maxwell’s Equations (446). Now, derivatives of ﬁelds are mathematical entities that
do not stand in a simple relation to observable quantities (cf. Feyerabend 1962, 28 fn. 1). Earman
and Roberts accept that exceptionless (or proviso free, in Hempel’s (1988) terms) laws are tested
through speciﬁc physical models. But they argue that physicists intend to test exceptionless laws
when they use speciﬁc models; and that establishing exceptionless laws is the goal of physicists
throughout history (Earman and Roberts 1999, 445-46). Because of this intention, genuine laws
of nature must be exceptionless.
Earman and Roberts’s appeal to the intentions of historical ﬁgures is parallel to Psillos’s and
Putnam’s (sec. 1). I am less willing to give physicists’ intentions philosophical weight—Maxwell
intended his models to refer to the aether, and realists need to reject its existence. These appeals to
intentions make trouble for realism. I also doubt the broad correctness of Earman and Roberts’s
claim that perfect generality was scientists’ goal. There certainly were some, as Earman and Roberts
cite. However, there are also counter-examples. The danger here is projecting a particular philo-
sophical view of laws of nature—as universal and exceptionless—onto historical ﬁgures. Newton’s
Laws have been qualiﬁed since their introduction (cf. Earman, Roberts, and Smith 2002, 283-86).
Here is the ﬁrst of Newton’s “Axioms, or the Laws of Motion” from the Principia Mathematica:
Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward,
except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed.
Projectiles persevere in their motions, except insofar as they are retarded by the resis-
tance of the air and are impelled downward by the force of gravity. A spinning hoop
[…]. (Newton [1687] 1999, 416)
If the statement of a law contains the word “except,” there is little hope for it to be exceptionless. A
modern counter-example is Paul Dirac, who believed that all scientiﬁc theories are approximations
(Wright 2016).
The dominant view of laws in the philosophy of science is that they are universal and excep-
tionless. This holds over a wide range of further metaphysical views about laws. For example, on an
empiricist view of laws—descended from Ramsey, and Lewis—a given law is nothing but a label
for regularities in the world; Earman has endorsed this view. In contrast, a realist view of laws—
expressed by Dretsky, Tooley, and Armstrong—takes it that laws exist as part of the furniture of the
world. Both empiricist and realist metaphysicians can agree that laws are universal and exception-
less.22 However, it is evident that this philosophical idealization is inapt for characterizing laws of
22. See Mumford 2005, and references therein. Earman: 401; regularity, universality, etc.: 404.
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nature as they were expressed in the history and practice of science (Cartwright 1980).23 In New-
ton’s actual words, his laws are much less “liars” than on a philosopher’s logical re-formulation,
such as ‘all F s are Gs’ (after Cartwright 1983). Instead, I think that ceteris paribus laws oﬀer a
better framework for discussing laws of nature. Here, too, multiple underlying metaphysical views
are possible; for example, Cartwright’s (1999) causal powers and SR (or so I argue).
What about the speciﬁc ceteris paribus clauses in FL? Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002) would
label some of the conditions in table (1) as simple “conditions of applicability” that are left unstated
by “lazy” scientists. Laws concerning the refraction of beams of light are understood to need beams
and media. While such conditions would preclude FL from being fundamental laws, they would
still be scientiﬁc laws in good standing. Other conditions are more problematic. Here is the heart
of the matter: Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002) argue that the only ceteris paribus clauses that
should worry philosophers are those that are “ineliminable” from the laws (283-84). Problems arise
if we can never close-oﬀ the condition in a simple formulation. The argument against counting
ceteris paribus laws as laws of nature is that expressions with these “ineliminable” clauses are no
laws at all. They are not even well formed formal or linguistic objects. On the other hand, if all we
have to do is require polarized beams and ﬂat boundaries, there is no cause for concern. Advocates
of the exceptionless generalization view can accept that laws with “conditions of applicability” are
laws (even if not “fundamental”). I happily accept that “conditions of applicability” do not pose a
problem for accepting FL as laws of nature.
Philosophers such as Ronald Giere (1999) and Marc Lange (2000) have argued that there are
laws with ineliminable ceteris paribus clauses. Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002, 284) complain
that these philosophers construe ceteris paribus conditions such as ‘requires beams of light’ as “in-
deﬁnite” and ineliminable only because they refuse to use the language of physics within their ceteris
paribus clause. They have a good point. For the case of FL and intensities I labeled the condition
on intensity in table (1) as “not too high.” Modern physicists would specify this much more pre-
cisely: FL hold so long as the intensity of incident light—understood in terms of Einstein-Maxwell
electrodynamics—does not approach the binding energy of electrons in the crystal lattice, or other
relevant quantum mechanical features of the medium (Boyd 2003, Ch.s 3 and 5). For Earman,
Roberts, and Smith (2002), specifying the terms of ceteris paribus clauses does not elevate a ceteris
paribus law to a fundamental law. But the elimination of “ineliminable” ceteris paribus clauses does
bring these relations within their overall framework of lawful explanations.
Are any of the conditions in FL ineliminable? On one reading, yes. There is no simple list of
birefringent materials, and isotropic materials can become birefringent in diﬀerent circumstances;
for example in an electric ﬁeld (the Kerr eﬀect, discovered 1875). One can go some way to ordering
the possibilities by referring to the 230 groups of crystal symmetries, but the number of possible
crystals that can be formed may be limitless (Hahn 2006). The periodic table is not closed. Similar
concerns exist with more general forms of non-linear media. And as discussed above, even isotropic
23. For this history before Newton, see Ruby 1986.
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and linear materials will not follow FL if the intensity of the light is high enough. Realists may
have to accept that brute ceteris paribus clauses must be included in their fundamental structures.
However, it is possible to “close oﬀ” these ceteris paribus clauses. Take the example of the
closure of the periodic table. It is the case that our collection of known elements is not a necessarily
complete list. It is also the case that as elements ﬁll-out the table they become less stable. We do
not know why this is the case. The half-life of Tennessine (atomic number 117, named by the
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry in 2016) is 0.051 seconds. This is clearly too
short a lifetime in which to form crystals which could plausibly be tested in an optics experiment.
In this way, an ineliminable ceteris paribus clause can be reconstituted as an eliminable quantitative
limit on the atoms which make up stable matter (a minimum half-life) of the material conditions
necessary for the Laws to hold.
With this manoeuvre, I view FL as neither exceptionless generalizations, nor among the dan-
gerous, anti-unity-of-science ceteris paribus laws Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002) are most con-
cerned about. My view ﬁts Cartwright’s, who did not recognize the targets of her investigations
in Earman, Roberts, and Smith’s analysis (Cartwright 2002). FL only hold ceteris paribus ; and
these clauses specify the physical situations in which the laws apply. These clauses may refer in a
quantitative way to other physical theories, such as specifying the maximum intensity of beams of
light in terms of the quantum theory of crystal lattices. Or these clauses may fall-short of this level
of speciﬁcity and integration with other laws. Ineliminable ceteris paribus clauses make laws uncon-
tainable in principle. Ineliminable ceteris paribus clauses cannot be speciﬁed in terms of other laws,
and therefore threaten the unity of science and the primacy of fundamental physics over the special
sciences (Earman, Roberts, and Smith 2002). But I do not see ineliminable ceteris paribus clauses
applying here. FL can be deﬁned in a ﬁnite set of words and symbols. And they can be connected
to other scientiﬁc theories. In my view, this makes FL deﬁnite-enough structures to sustain realist
commitment to their place among the constituents of the world.
4.2 Legal dynamics
I see the core relations of FL as continuous over time, but with changing ceteris paribus clauses.
Some clauses changed, in the sense of becoming-speciﬁed to other theories, and some new clauses
were added. Through this the central description of light reﬂecting and refracting at media re-
mained constant. (Even the mathematical notation was quite stable.) Ceteris paribus laws with
stable central expressions and dynamic clauses provide a framework for capturing what is conserved
throughout scientiﬁc change (cf. Post 1971).
A historical dynamics of laws was an impossibility for Hempel and Oppenheim. They argued
that laws are strictly true statements, with no allowance for laws which are true only relative to
available evidence.
Thus, for example, we would not say that Bode’s general formula for the distance of
the planets from the sun was a law relatively to the astronomical evidence available in
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the 1770s, when Bode propounded it, and that it ceased to be a law after the discovery
of Neptune and the determination of its distance from the sun; rather, we would say
that the limited original evidence had given a high probability to the assumption that
the formula was a law, whereas more recent additional information reduced that prob-
ability so much as to make it practically certain that Bode’s formula is not generally
true, and hence not a law. (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 152)
On my view, Bode’s law was a law ca. 1770, and is still a law today, even if the addition of ceteris
paribus clauses makes it rather unhelpful for understanding our solar system.
Hempel andOppenheimwere left with a kind of transcendental philosophy of laws of nature, in
which “[t]he requirement of truth for laws has the consequence that a given empirical statement S
can never be deﬁnitely known to be a law” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 152). These laws are of
central importance, but we can never know them. This connection between truth and general laws
has carried through in the contemporary literature: “Typical theories from fundamental physics
are such that if they were true, there would be precise proviso-free laws” (Earman and Roberts
1999, 446; cited in Ladyman and Ross 2007, 283). Hempel and Oppenheim were explicit that
they required their picture of laws of nature in scientiﬁc explanation to ﬁt with a particular theory
of truth. In contrast, realist replies to historicist critiques are most concerned with the continuity
of scientiﬁc reference.
Reliance on these in-principle-unknowable laws causes problems for SR. First a historical prob-
lem: If a structuralist rejects ceteris paribus laws, they must abandon their best historical exam-
ple of structural continuity over revolutionary theory change.24 A logical procedure would be to
look for universal exceptionless generalizations which have survived theory change. Unfortunately,
(true) universal exceptionless generalizations cannot be identiﬁed. (They function more like regu-
lative ideals, or “ideal knowledge achievement[s]” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 286; cf. Earman and
Roberts 1999, 446).) As such, an appeal to exceptionless generalizations to defeat the Pessimistic
Metainduction is excluded. The ﬁrst problem for structuralists is not whether scientists have epis-
temic access to exceptionless generalizations. The problem is whether philosophers and historians
have access to true exceptionless generalizations to mount a defence against the PMI. I am not
contesting that the search for exceptionless generalizations has motivated some scientists. I am
arguing that whether-or-not that has been the case, exceptionless generalizations are an unsuitable
basis upon which to build SR.
This is related to a contemporary problem for exceptionless-SR: there are no current structures
in which to believe. Any currently-available scientiﬁc laws which are interpreted as “exceptionless”
24. It does not follow that once FL were derived fromMaxwell’s theory, the survival of FL somehow transfers to Maxwell’s
equations, quantum electrodynamics, and gauge symmetry groups, as French seems to suggest (French 2014, 154). This is
particularly the case if proponents of OSR make a qualitative distinction between FL as ceteris paribus laws and Maxwell’s
equations as candidate-universal exceptionless generalizations. It is true that Maxwell’s equations also survived the transition
to modern physics. But they are now viewed as only accurate under certain physical limits, and are no longer viewed as
fundamental.
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are false.25 As a realist, I want more than this. Like Cartwright, I want a realism that can ground
human action (Cartwright 1999, Introduction). To take a non-optical example: the Earth’s cli-
mate in an unobservable scientiﬁc entity. Our understanding of the climate has widely varied over
time, and is now mediated through complex modelling practices (Edwards 2010). Nevertheless,
the key realist argument which supports human action is the reality of the relation between in-
creasing carbon dioxide levels and climate change eﬀects. I see ceteris paribus laws as a framework
for a philosophical understanding of contemporary, identiﬁable, structures which can undergird
philosophers’ commitment to their reality today.
My positive framing carries through the historical trajectory of ceteris paribus clauses. This has
been discussed in the context of Ernst Nagel’s logic of scientiﬁc reduction as a type of explanation
(Nagel 1961, 1970; Sarkar 2015). Clark Glymour (1970) saw inter-theoretic explanations as more
complicated than Nagel’s logical deductions. For him, “one of the functions of inter-theoretical
explanation is removal of ceteris paribus clauses which experience makes us impose on our laws
and theories” (342). (For Glymour, “removing” a ceteris paribus clause is what I have referred to
as “specifying” one with respect to another theory.) This ﬁts well with my picture of the dynamics
of ceteris paribus clauses. For a fundamentalist, the discovery of quantum behaviour is a blow.
Einstein’s Equations—considered as exceptionless generalizations, meant to be valid at all length-
scales—are falsiﬁed (as some “fundamentalists” accept Hoefer 2008, 319). For me, the discovery
of ceteris paribus clauses—and their speciﬁcation with respect to other theories—are clear advances
of scientiﬁc knowledge. When we better know the limits of our equations, we better know the
world.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have considered historical and philosophical perspectives on Fresnel’s Laws of op-
tics. Philosophically, I characterize FL as ceteris paribus laws, understood on Cartwright’s view.
The content of FL is not only a series of mathematical expressions and linguistic terms, the content
also includes the conditions under which the Laws apply. This is in contrast to another view of
laws, in which laws do not include ceteris paribus clauses, and each law-statement is seen as a po-
tential true, universal, and exceptionless generalization. There are, I think, two central complaints
against the ceteris paribus picture. First, as Earman and co-workers have elaborated, if a given ceteris
paribus clause is—in principle—ineliminable from a putative law-statement, this statement is too
ill-deﬁned to be counted as a law. In addition, these ineliminable clauses pose a barrier to quan-
titative pictures of the unity of science (in which all laws may be subsumed under a most-general
law, or as mathematical approximations to a most-fundamental law, etc.). However, Cartwright
25. This is so, not because an exceptionless generalization needs to explain literally everything, but because structures
like Maxwell’s equations are not empirically adequate in all cases. Hence relativity, quantum theory, etc. It was clearly not
Hempel’s or Earman et al.’s intent, but a similar objection may be applied to analyses of scientiﬁc explanation in terms of
exceptionless generalizations. Strictly speaking, on this view, has there ever been a scientiﬁc explanation?
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(2002) does not accept that ineliminable clauses are essential to the ceteris paribus picture of laws,
and I agree. The second complaint to the ceteris paribus picture is that universal and exceptionless
laws are properly ‘fundamental’ but ceteris paribus laws are not. Brieﬂy, my view is the following:
FL count as ceteris paribus laws; on the universal and exceptionless view, FL are either not laws or
are not ‘fundamental’ laws. Insofar as realists appeal to the history of FL to rebut the Pessimistic
Metainduction, they need a picture of laws which includes FL. Secondly, if a realist’s response to
the PMI is to be consistent with their speciﬁc metaphysical proposal (ESR, OSR, dispositions,
etc.) they should use the same picture of laws in the history as in the metaphysics. If this means
that the metaphysical picture of scientiﬁc realism no longer includes ‘fundamental’ universal and
exceptionless laws, I see no other option than to cut this sense of ‘fundamental’ loose. It is far
from a novel observation that in the history of science, what is conserved through generations of
change and revolution is often the “lower-level structure” (Post 1971, 237). I agree with Worrall
(1989b) that defeating the PMI is a prior concern for realists than questions about truth or, here,
fundamentality (sec. 1). What else should scientiﬁc realists take for building a metaphysics than
that which has survived centuries of intellectual upheaval? Further discussion of fundamentality,
laws of nature, and the current scientiﬁc realism debate must be deferred to a future publication.
In my historical discussion, I agree with the general tenor of realist comment on FL: their
survival for almost two centuries oﬀers an optimistic rebuttal to the PMI. However, I take exception
to two speciﬁc historical claims made by Worrall and Psillos. It was not the case that physicists’
modern views of the electromagnetic ﬁeld and (absence of ) the aether took hold far earlier than
1905. Second, it was the case that James Clerk Maxwell believed in the existence of a luminiferous
aether as the medium for the propagation of light. My central purpose here is not to comment
on Psillos’s and others’ strategy of relying on scientists’ historical views to indicate which parts of
past scientiﬁc theories are suited for realist belief, however, I think this material makes Psillos’s
strategy diﬃcult to uphold (cf. Cordero 2012). Under Worrall’s original historical picture, the
experimental basis for applying and testing FL was relatively constant (pace the importance of
electro- and magneto-optics). With my periodization, the transition of FL from a material aether
theory to modern electrodynamics without a (material) aether overlaps with the development of
the quantum theory of solids and of radiation. These developments—culminating with the maser
and laser—put new limits on the applicability of FL.
The ceteris paribus view of laws is well suited to the historical trajectory of FL. As the core
expression of FL passed through generations of physical experiments and theories, its ceteris paribus
clauses changed in content and in number. Following a line of thought from Nagel and Glymour,
the speciﬁcation of ceteris paribus clauses in terms of other theories is an expression of scientiﬁc
progress. As our understanding of crystals improved, FL’s ceteris paribus clauses became better
understood and quantitatively related to “solid-state” physics. With high-energy beams of light,
qualitatively new phenomena were created, and mathematical expressions—qualitatively diﬀerent
from FL—were devised to describe them. Because of these qualitative diﬀerences, there is not a
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well-deﬁned sense in which FL are logically derivable, or mathematically approximate-able, from
an underlying quantum theory. This seems to be a general feature of physical theories (Batterman
2012). As Sarkar (2015) recently emphasized, Nagel’s theory of inter-theoretic reduction always
included qualitative factors. The universal and exceptionless view of laws rejects these qualitative
factors because they specify limitations on the applicability of laws of nature, and because they refer
to particular physical phenomena and apparatuses. These factors ﬁt naturally with the ceteris paribus
view of laws. Diachronically, they link up with Glymour’s picture of inter-theoretic relations, and
synchronically they form links between physical theories, forming the basis for a unifying view of
science.
The ceteris paribus picture of laws with “eliminable” clauses, ﬁts the history of Fresnel’s Laws
and provides a well-deﬁned framework for understanding scientiﬁc structures. The universal ex-
ceptionless generalizations picture of laws cannot rebut historicist anti-realism, nor can it ground a
contemporary scientiﬁc realism; we simply do not have any examples of true universal exceptionless
generalizations. Under these conditions, ceteris paribus laws are the better framework for Structural
Realism.
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